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Introduction 1
The European economy has been hit hard by
the global economic and financial crisis.
Commentators have been reaching for the
superlatives to describe the extent of the
impact and the threat to economic well-
being: the most frequent comparison is with
1929 and the Great Depression that followed.
Others, though, have pointed the finger at
single actors – central banks and their ‘easy
money’ policies, greedy Wall Street titans,
sleepy regulators – implying that, once such
incompetents have been removed, we can
return to business as usual. Still others cling
to a medieval-style fatalism in which crises
are a divine and inevitable penalty for
ineradicable human sins.
This article looks at the extent of the chal-
lenge facing European policymakers as a
result of the crisis. It provides an analysis of
the current economic situation, looks at the
forces that have driven the European econo-
my off what had until recently been a quite
decent and seemingly sustainable growth tra-
jectory, and considers how deep and pro-
tracted the downturn is likely to be. From
this it concludes that, unlike the United
States, where a prolonged and serious down-
turn is inevitable, the European economy
could be steered relatively swiftly out of the
mess, provided decisive policy action is
taken. The article then proposes a set of five
essential steps that need to be taken in the
short term at European and national level to
arrest the downturn, and points out areas
requiring substantial ‘structural reforms’ in
the medium term. Given the serious question-
marks as to whether European policymakers
will do the right thing, one can be no more
than conditionally optimistic about the medi-
um-term prospects. A 1929-scenario is far
from inevitable, but it remains a possibility.
The current situation and immedi-
ate outlook
Having recovered painfully slowly from the
downturn initiated by the collapse of the
Internet bubble, the European economy had
performed strongly in 2006 and around trend
in 2007. The first audible rumblings of the
crisis in the summer of 2007 did not imme-
diately affect quarterly growth rates; initially
it seemed that Europe might manage to ‘de-
couple’ from the US.
However, following unexpectedly strong
first-quarter figures in 2008 (flattered by a
mild winter), economic growth plunged.
Following a quarter-on-quarter contraction
of 0.2% in the second quarter in the euro
area (0.0% in EU27), the first estimate for
the third quarter is for a contraction of 0.2%
(in both the euro area and EU27).
This course of events has been accompanied
by equally swift downward revisions of fore-
casts for 2009 (Table 1). From earlier predic-
tions of around 1.5%, below-trend, but far
from a crisis, all the major international
institutions now foresee a contraction in eco-
nomic output in Europe in 2009, and have
emphasised the downward risks to their fore-
cast. Just a month after its major autumn
forecast in October, the IMF rushed out an
update (end November) in which the GDP
forecast was cut by 0.7 percentage points
(p.p.).
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1 I have benefited from discussions with numerous
colleagues on the economic crisis. I am particularly
grateful to Peter Coldrick, Frank Hoffer, Bela
Galgoczi, Vera Glassner, Volker Hallwirth, Maria
Jepsen, Heike Joebges, Karl Pichelmann and
Philippe Pochet for comments on a previous draft.
The usual disclaimer applies.
In the course of November a whole slew of
negative data came in2. Most worryingly,
unemployment, an indicator that lags the
business cycle, is creeping up, to 7.7% and
7.1% in the euro area and EU27 (from lows
of 7.2% and 6.7%). Almost a quarter of a
million jobs were lost in the euro area in
October alone.
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Table 1: Economic forecasts for 2009, euro area (EU27)
2 Volume of retail trade down 0.8% in the euro area
and 0.3% in EU27 (October on previous month);
industrial production -1.6% in the euro area and
-1.1% in EU27; and incoming industrial orders:
-3.9% in euro area and -4.6% in EU27 (both
September on previous month).
IMF
European
Commission
OECD
-0.5%
(Nov. 6)
0.1% (0.2%)
(Early Nov.)
-0.6
(Late Nov.)
0.2%
(Oct.)
1.5% (1.8%)
(Spring)
1.4%
(Spring)
1.2%
(Apr.)
Worse is clearly to come. Forward-looking
indicators have fallen precipitously (Fig. 1).
The European Commission’s confidence
indicators for the euro area have plummeted
to depths not seen since the start of monetary
union, while the ifo Institute’s euro area sur-
vey is now at levels equivalent to the reces-
sion of the early 1990s, and has yet to bottom
out. The immediate cause of this collapse in
business confidence is not hard to make out.
European firms are being squeezed from
both sides. At the same time as both domes-
tic and export demand weakens and uncer-
tainties grow about sales prospects, firms
face a severe increase in the cost of and/or
the difficulty of access to the finance they
need for investment and, in some cases,
merely to replenish working capital. 
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Figure 1a, 1b: IFO and EC confidence indicators: collapse in confidence 
Source: Ifo Institute
Source: European Commission
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Figure 2
Figure 3
Figure 4
Source: OECD Economic Outlook, 84, Nov. 2008
Figs. 2, 3 and 4 provide a succinct illustra-
tion of the three main dimensions of the
financial squeeze on firms. Firstly, stock
markets in the euro area have plunged almost
exactly in parallel to those in the US. Even
non-financial listed companies have lost
about 40% of their book value; for financials
the hit amounts to around 60%. This makes it
difficult for firms to raise equity capital and
– for financially viable firms – also reduces
the incentive to invest in new capacity.3
Secondly, OECD composite measures of
bank lending indicate that banks are mas-
sively restricting their lending to firms,
either in the form of increased costs or other
restrictions, such as demanding higher levels
of collateral (although rather less in the euro
area than in the US). This of course is a
knock-on effect of the wave of pervasive
uncertainty that has hit the banking system,
and the real or perceived need of banks to
repair their balance sheets and retain capital. 
Thirdly, the spread between the interest rate
on corporate bonds and those on benchmark
government securities, in  normal times
between 1 and 2 p.p., has shot up to as much
as 6.p.p.; again this is topped by the US.
Firms with slightly lower credit-ratings, in
particular, are now paying a very much high-
er premium on new bond issues. Even if the
impact is partly offset by a decline in the
benchmark rate (reflecting the economic
recession and lower central bank rates), this
implies a huge increase in the costs to (large)
firms of obtaining finance on corporate debt
markets.
All these indicators point to a bleak short-run
outlook for the European economy. Overseas
demand has fallen sharply. Consumers and
especially firms are retrenching. Business
confidence is shattered. Banks are reluctant
to lend to each other – as evinced by still
high spreads of inter-bank rates over short-
term policy rates – and to non-financial busi-
nesses and households. Under such condi-
tions the economic contraction is bound to
continue over the coming quarters. Before
we can assess how long and how deep the
recession will be, we need to consider the
developments that have led to the crisis.
How did we get here?
The causes of the crisis have been much dis-
cussed and are clearly complex. Much as in
a war, the definitive account, if it is ever
written, will probably have to wait for the
‘fog of crisis’ to lift. What is undisputed is
that the centre of the storm was in the USA
from where it moved directly to Europe and
also indirectly via emerging markets. Behind
this development lay a whole series of imbal-
ances at different levels and in different
spheres that interacted with developments in
the way advanced capitalist economies have
been operating, particularly but not exclu-
sively in their financial sectors. This section
looks at some of these fundamental drivers
behind the crisis, focusing on seven key
developments, and provides a provisional
interpretation of some of the causal linkages
between them. It will be necessarily
schematic and the trends identified will
apply with greater force in some countries
than others. Further analysis will be required
to tease out the interactions between these
trends more precisely. It then shows how
these trends served to accelerate a downturn
in economic activity in Europe that had more
direct and also more familiar causes.
Fundamental causes of the crisis
A prominent feature of global economic
developments has been pronounced and per-
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3 Tobin’s Q, the ratio of stock valuations to the
replacement cost of listed firms’ assets, has fallen
and companies have less incentive to invest in new
capacity rather than acquire existing firms’ assets
via takeovers.
sistent current account imbalances. Most
notably the USA (but also, in Europe, the
UK and Spain) have run large current
account deficits, offset by corresponding
surpluses in, notably, China, Japan and
Germany. Total domestic consumption and
investment in the US has been persistently
and substantially (of the order of 5-6% of
GDP) above domestic output. The gap has
been met by borrowing: surplus countries
have piled up financial assets which have
kept long-run interest rates in the US low
(and thus helped sustain the imbalances).
Surplus countries have sought to export their
way out of unemployment (Germany, Japan)
or into rapid industrialisation (China).4
Increasingly dissatisfied with meagre returns
on safe assets, such as Treasury bills, they
(alongside domestic investors) have pur-
chased more complex, opaque assets provid-
ed by Wall Street financial alchemists (to
which we return)that offered higher rates of
return. In Europe, Germany’s persistent trade
surpluses are one important fundamental
reason why its banks held large amounts of
what subsequently proved to be toxic finan-
cial products originated in the US.
A second feature has been the rapid interna-
tionalisation of production, investment and
financial linkages – in short ‘globalisation’ –
without a corresponding development of
supervisory and other forms of regulation at
an appropriate (global, European) level.
Global institutions still reflect the geo-polit-
ical realities of the post-Second World War
period and, at best, their policies and activi-
ties reflect the needs of isolated (developing)
countries requiring support. One conse-
quence of this lack of appropriate institution-
al arrangements has been regulatory compe-
tition between jurisdictions in areas such as
taxation, corporate law, financial sector reg-
ulation, etc. The lack of effective global gov-
ernance allowed the problem of current
account imbalances to fester.
Partly as a result of these shortcomings, but
partly also in the wake of a major political
shift in advanced capitalist economies since
the early 1980s, we have seen, thirdly, a sus-
tained and far-reaching process of state with-
drawal from involvement in the economy.
Amongst other things, state ownership (not
least of financial institutions) has been
reduced,  labour market and welfare state
institutions have been weakened, commer-
cialised, or privatised, enforced (or at least
enforceable) legal regulation has been
dropped in favour of codes of conduct and
so-called self-regulation. Legal and social
constraints on the operation of businesses,
and not least the influence of trade unions,
have been massively reduced in favour of
‘right to manage’ and ‘shareholder value’
approaches. Key in the present context is that
it is not the case that governments have sim-
ply failed to keep up with financial innova-
tion. The financial services sector has been
actively de-regulated at the explicit behest
(and in the US, at least) with the help of sub-
stantial political donations of financial insti-
tutions that are now holding out their hand
for state support. Ironically, many of the reg-
ulations repealed – such as the Glass Steagall
Act in the US – had been introduced in the
wake of the Great Depression.
These trends, perhaps enhanced by techno-
logical developments, have led, fourthly, to
very substantial shifts in income distribution
in most advanced capitalist countries.
Almost all advanced capitalist countries have
seen major shifts in the functional distribu-
tion of income (i.e. from labour to profits)
and/or widening disparities in personal
income (a wider gap between the rich and the
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4 Ironically Asian countries’ desire to pile up foreign
currency reserves was in large part a reaction to
their experiences of capital flight during the Asian
crisis of 1997ff. 
poor, and especially a de-coupling of the
incomes of the rich from those of the rest of
society) .5 This has placed an increased share
of resources in the hands of those who, rather
than consume it in the form of real goods and
services, have used it to speculate on finan-
cial markets. Meanwhile, at the other end of
the income scale, the poor have been forced
to expand borrowing in order to maintain liv-
ing standards in the face of stagnating real
wages in many countries.6
Still poorly understood is the way in which,
fifthly, this has interacted with the ‘finan-
cialisation’ of the economy. This umbrella
term covers diverse trends such as the
increasing size of the financial sector, the
expanding volume of financial transactions
and products (relative to GDP), and changes
in corporate governance towards ‘sharehold-
er value’, the increased use of stock options
and other forms of (short-term) incentive
payments to senior managers, the growing
role of Chief Financial Officers within large
corporations, and changes in the structure
and products of the financial industry itself.
Without attempting a full analysis, a number
of key points can be made.7 The rising share
of profits in national income (in most coun-
tries) has not been accompanied by a rising
investment share. The activities of corporate
managers appear ever more driven by short-
term concerns (specifically an obsession
with current share prices), which may partly
explain the sluggish investment (with respect
to high profits). A concomitant of this is that
much of the funds potentially available for
‘real’ investment instead flowed into either
existing real assets (notably housing) or into
financial claims of increasing complexity
and opacity. 
One aspect of financialisation has had such
importance for the crisis that I will treat it
separately (although it is intimately related to
the trends just mentioned). It is, sixthly,
securitisation – the rendering tradable of for-
merly untraded contractual relationships,
such as mortgages and other loans, and thus
the diffusion of risk exposure (e.g. Frank and
Krahnen 2008). Technological improvements
and competition between deregulated (and
globalised) financial institutions led, against
the background of increased demand for sav-
ings opportunities by institutional investors
(flooded with the savings of retirees as a
result of demographic processes and pension
privatisation) and wealthy individuals, to a
proliferation of increasingly complex finan-
cial products. For our purposes, a number of
key features need to be mentioned. The sell-
ing-on of risk has led to misaligned incen-
tives on the part of those originating the
underlying contracts8, in particular to mis-
representation of the nature and extent of
risk to ill-informed consumers; ownership of
various securities (and of the attendant risks)
has become virtually impossible to trace and
thus to monitor; purchasers of such products
have tended to put their faith in rating agen-
cies which have a quasi-legally institution-
alised oligopoly and are paid by product-
issuers (and not purchasers), and/or have
taken out ‘insurance’ in the form of credit
default swaps (which are of dubious value
The economic and financial crisis in Europe
7 EEE Policy Brief 3/2008
5 The OECD has recently published a comprehensive
study of income inequality trends over the last twen-
ty years (OECD 2008).
6 This latter trend has been exacerbated by develop-
ments such as cuts in public provision of health care,
higher education finance, etc.
7 Contributions that have begun to tease out some of
the implications of ‘financialisation’ include: Hein
and van Treeck (2008), Palley (2008a) For an analy-
sis of the role of private equity within this complex
see Watt (2008). 
8 It can be noted in passing that this is not the case pro-
vided one assumes ‘perfect information’. Of course
precisely this abstruse assumption is a cornerstone,
along with its close cousin, ‘rational expectations’,
of mainstream economic theory. 
and constitute an important remaining
source of financial-market risk). The main
result of this has been a vast increase in var-
ious measures of ‘leverage’: higher ratios of
household debt to GDP, a shift in the balance
between equity and debt finance in corpora-
tions, rising mortgage debt to housing equity
ratios, etc.
It is only against this background that a sev-
enth feature, to which many commentators
have, in my view incorrectly, ascribed central
importance in explaining the crisis, can and
must be mentioned: a period of historically
low real interest rates. It is true that low real
interest rates increased the appetite for risk
(‘search for yield’) and were a proximate
cause of inflating asset prices and increased
leverage. Yet the appropriate level of interest
rates must be judged against the performance
of the economy (the ‘supply side’).
Particularly in the case of Europe, which
recovered painfully slowly from the 2001
downturn, it is hard to argue that interest
rates were set too low. A more plausible argu-
ment can be made that modern central bank-
ing (and economic theory) has relied too
heavily on interest-rate setting, and ignored
other demand-management instruments
(notably fiscal policy) and other central bank
instruments (such as minimum reserve
requirements and other supervisory and reg-
ulatory measures), so as to pursue aims such
as financial stability without affecting the
management of the real economy.
While the causal chains discussed above are
still imperfectly understood, it is clear in ret-
rospect that this constellation of very diverse
factors constituted a perfect storm of com-
plex interacting forces. Any attempt to iden-
tify one single culprit or policy mistake
behind the crisis is doomed to failure. On the
other hand, these factors have been around
for several years, in some cases decades. We
must therefore now turn to the proximate
causes of the 2008 downturn in Europe.
Proximate causes of the crisis
The above structural features, and especially
the role of the financial sector, have been
much discussed (and frequently misinter-
preted). Many observers have overlooked a
series of quite traditional negative aggregate
demand shocks that have hit the European
economy in recent months, constituting the
proximate causes of the slowdown. This risks
leading to inadequate policy recommenda-
tions (such as focussing on medium-term re-
regulation of the financial sector). The main
contractionary impulses have been as fol-
lows:
• Sharp rise in commodity prices: oil prices
more than doubled in euro terms from
under EUR40 to around EUR90 between
the start of 2007 and the summer of
2008 9, similar spikes were recorded in a
large number of other commodities: non-
energy commodity prices were rising at
year-on-year rates of around 10% during
2008. This raised firms’ costs and
depressed workers’ real incomes, reduc-
ing aggregate demand, as inflation briefly
spiked at around 4%.
• Sharp appreciation of the euro: the euro
appreciated against the USD, still the
leading global currency, from USD 1.20
to 1.60 – that is by a massive 33% –
between the start of 2006 and the summer
of 2008. There was a broadly parallel rise
against the yen. The nominal effective
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9 The much greater increases in the (usually cited)
USD prices were offset to a considerable extent by
currency appreciation. The oil price (in euros) has
since returned to roughly the level at the start of
2007. The figures in this and the following two bul-
let points are taken from the European
Commission’s ‘Key indicators for the euro area’:
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/
publication12486_en.pdf
exchange rate of the euro rose around
15% by the summer of 2008 from its aver-
age in 2005. While partially offsetting the
rise in world commodity prices, the
strength of the euro squeezed firm’s prof-
it margins in the tradable goods sector and
depressed net exports. As a result the
EA15 trade and current account balances
have moved from a slight surplus into
deficit and export orders have plunged to
a level not seen since the 1990s recession.
• Lagged effect of higher interest rates: the
ECB began raising interest rates at the
start of 2006. Eight rate hikes brought
rates from 2.0% to 4.0% by mid-2007,
against the background of rising headline
inflation rates, largely driven by higher
imported prices. 10 Through the usual
transmission channels (including the cur-
rency appreciation already mentioned)
and with the usual lags this has depressed
aggregate demand. 
• On top of these three major restrictive
factors, which negatively affected all the
European economies in a broadly similar
way, (especially within the euro area), a
number of individual countries faced spe-
cific problems. The UK, Ireland and
Spain, in particular, shared a number of
features of the US economy: housing bub-
bles, rising household debts and/or cur-
rent account deficits or growing problems
of international competitiveness. Such
features were also characteristic of a num-
ber of the New Member States, exacerbat-
ed there by an increasing reliance on
household debt denominated in non-
national currencies. From a European per-
spective, however, it should be empha-
sised that a needed cooling of some of
these economies, by itself, should not
have provoked a continent-wide slow-
down as some other countries, and espe-
cially Germany, were simultaneously
starting to grow at a faster rate and, at last,
seeing faster wage growth, thus helping to
re-balance the intra-European economy. 
The interaction of home-made and exter-
nal factors: from slowdown to crisis
The dramatic downturn in the US, the
unwinding of the financial and housing bub-
bles, the freezing up of credit markets, etc.,
which began in the summer of 2007, but
accelerated dramatically in the autumn of
this year, were saddled on top of these fac-
tors, which had already been eating away at
the dynamic of economic activity in Europe.
A schematic illustration of how the conta-
gion from across the Atlantic and the under-
lying imbalances (discussed in 3.1) acceler-
ated the impact of the largely internal (except
commodity prices) restrictive forces (dis-
cussed in 3.2) in recent months is given in
Figure 5.
The crisis was initiated by the deflating of
the US housing bubble (and later the equity
bubble), which set off a vicious chain reac-
tion, with a number of negative feedback
mechanisms.11 This had a direct effect on
consumer demand as rising house prices had
been the cash cow of stretched US con-
sumers (equity withdrawal, mortgage refi-
nancing). Defaults and foreclosures
increased. Worse, the securitisation of the
underlying assets swiftly led to the implosion
of the US financial sector, as losses emerged
and confidence in the solvency of counter-
parties evaporated. The resulting credit
crunch then impacted consumers and non-
financial businesses that could no longer roll
over loans, causing consumers to retrench
and firms to lay off workers.
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10 It is important to note, however, that despite the
massive imported price shocks, core inflation
remained anchored at around 2.5% during the year.
11 This is an extremely condensed account, as our
interest is on the impact on Europe. For more
detailed accounts on the unfolding of the US crisis
see Baker (2009).
There were (and continue to be) four main
transmission mechanisms across the
Atlantic. 
• US consumer retrenchment (and also
stalling business investment) directly
affected the sales opportunities of
European exporters, already squeezed by
past currency appreciation. 
• The European financial sector had been a
major purchaser of ‘toxic’ assets from US
banks. Their collapse in value of or the
cessation of trading in these assets led to
a knock-on implosion of the European
banking sector, which then hit European
companies (and to a lesser extent con-
sumers, especially homeowners).
• The massive rate cuts by the US Federal
Reserve in response to the crisis (initially
unmatched in Europe) led to a sharp fur-
ther fall in the USD against the euro,
exacerbating the competitive pressure on
European producers.
• Finally, and after a lag, the crisis also hit
emerging economies (not least, China,
where recent reports suggest a major
increase in unemployment is likely 12),
which led them to cut their import
demand.
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Figure 5
12 cf. ‘Beijing forecasts grim employment outlook’,
Financial Times, 21 November 2008:
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/6fb1207c-b774-11dd-
8e01-0000779fd18c.html
Source: Author’s conceptualisation
Within European economies, this then set in
train a standard negative interaction between
the corporate and the household sectors typ-
ical of any recession. Firms cut investment
and reduce working hours and staffing lev-
els. Households – facing increased uncer-
tainty, wealth-reducing asset price declines
and tougher credit constraints – save more
and some of them suffer income losses; over-
all consumption falls, worsening the situa-
tion of companies, which intensify job loss-
es, etc. On top of this come negative feed-
back loops between the banking system and
the household and non-financial corporate
sectors.
Before turning to discuss issues of economic
policy, it will be useful to sum up three key
findings of the preceding analysis, which are
decisive for the assessment of the crisis and
what can and must be done about it. They are
also important in that they are rather at odds
with widely held views on the nature of the
crisis. 
The first is that the roots of the crisis are
global, wide-ranging and highly complex, as
are, of course, the intricacies of the highly
developed financial systems that have served
to accelerate the crisis.
But secondly, and perhaps seemingly para-
doxically, the impact on the European econ-
omy and the causal chains now in play are
rather simple, not at all new and well under-
stood. Europe faces a severe negative
demand shock coupled with problems in its
banking and financial sector that, while the
details may have changed, are highly remi-
niscent of previous banking crises, notably
those in several Nordic countries in the early
1990s.
Thirdly, the European Union as a whole –
this is not true of all its members individual-
ly – was clearly not overheating and did not
suffer many of the major economic imbal-
ances that so characterised the United States
economy and to which the crisis is – in part
– a necessary response. As has happened
before (for instance in 2001), a downturn/cri-
sis has been ‘imported’ from the US at a
point in time at which, in terms of the supply
side of the European economy itself, further
sustained growth and, notably, reductions in
unemployment would have been possible.
The policy response so far
Before setting out a policy action plan, draw-
ing on the insights gained above, to address
the crisis, it will be useful very briefly to sum
up what has occurred already at the level of
the European institutions and key develop-
ments at Member State level.
Monetary authorities began already from the
summer of 2007 to implement various meas-
ures aimed at improving the liquidity posi-
tion of financial institutions. When inter-
bank lending dried up following the collapse
of Lehman Brothers in September of this
year, central banks massively expanded liq-
uidity provision to the banking system, eas-
ing requirements on collateral for refinanc-
ing operations. The ECB is generally regard-
ed as having acted swiftly and effectively in
this regard, not least in comparison with the
Bank of England, where objections to ‘bail-
ing out’ banks were part of the reason for the
Northern Rock debacle (e.g. Buiter 2007).
The story is very different regarding mone-
tary policy support for the real economy
through interest rate cuts, however. In the
teeth of what was, even before the Lehman
collapse, quite evidently a very serious
financial and economic crisis, the ECB kept
up a hawkish rhetoric, rejected calls for
interest-rate cuts 13, and in July it actually
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13 In the spring already the European Labour Network
for Economic Policy had called for 50bp of interest
rate cuts during the summer (ELNEP 2008).
raised interest rates. This step was justified
with respect to above-target inflation and the
supposed danger of inflationary wage-set-
ting. This paradoxical strategy of frantic sup-
port for the financial sector and restriction
on the real economy could not be maintained
long. In October the Bank was forced into an
embarrassing reversal, cutting rates (in a
coordinated action with other major central
banks). This was followed by further cuts in
November and December. However, while
substantial compared with the 25 basis point
(b.p.) adjustment typical of normal times,
they were dwarfed by the cuts in the US and
the UK. Overall, bank rates in these coun-
tries have been cut by 425 and 300 b.p., com-
pared with just 175 b.p. in the euro area.
Even if the crisis has hit the US and UK
harder than the euro area, the ECB is serious-
ly behind the curve in its demand-manage-
ment reaction to the crisis.
The activities of national governments in
response to the crisis can, from a European
perspective, be characterised as an initial
phase of ‘sauve qui peut’, followed by some
limited coordination of crisis management.
Initially governments scrambled to prevent
their national financial sectors from unravel-
ling. This quickly led to problems, however.
Public support for deposit insurance with
domestic banks, for instance, led to destabil-
ising shifts in savings as panicky European
savers sought to place funds where they
seemed safest. More fundamentally, the
whole concept of a ‘national’ financial sector
had been rendered moot by the
Europeanisation of financial institutions.
This led to serious rows between European
governments concerning the details of bail-
outs and depositor protection. Particularly
problematic was that some countries that
had, effectively, poached banking business,
by offering low-regulation and low-tax
regimes, then benefited from other coun-
tries’ rescue packages which covered sub-
sidiaries of domestic financial institutes reg-
istered in these countries. At the same time,
some European governments pragmatically
joined forces to save cross-border institu-
tions (such as the Benelux countries and
France in the cases of Dexia and Fortis). 
The European Commission issued a
Communication in October of this year that
was totally inadequate in its analysis and
short on concrete proposals (European
Commission 2008a).14 At the end of
November, though, the Commission
announced a European Economic Recovery
Plan which recognised the urgent need to
support aggregate demand and made a num-
ber of sensible proposals (European
Commission 2008b).15 Specifically, it called
for an immediate budgetary impulse of
EUR200bn (1.5% GDP, incl. 30bn from EU),
with the spending/tax mix left to member
states. In addition some mobilisation of
unused EU resources together with an addi-
tional 15 bn investments a year for two years
by the European Investment Bank. 
As welcome as this initiative is, it leaves
open key questions about implementation.
Europe has a classic collective action prob-
lem. There is a strong incentive on the part of
each Member State (especially small ones)
to free ride on the fiscal policy measures of
the others. The European Council met on
11/12 December – as this contribution was
going to press – and has agreed to support
the Commission’s package in principle, but
The economic and financial crisis in Europe
12 EEE Policy Brief 3/2008
14 Some samples. ‘The shocks hitting the European
economy are expected to (…) increase unemploy-
ment, thereby reducing demand. Structural reforms
are therefore essential to sustain demand in the
short-term (…)’ (p. 5) and a discussion of fiscal
policy focussing primarily on issues of longer-term
sustainability (ibid.).
15 However, there is a serious analytical (and resulting
policy-recommendation) error regarding wage
developments; see below.
with a reduced volume (around 1% of GDP).
It remains to be seen to what extent this com-
mitment is then transposed into actual
changes on the spending and revenue sides
of national budgets. Only such evidence will
disperse doubts about Europe’s ability to
mount an effective European response. 
Even allowing for the much more serious
nature of the crisis in the US, the speed with
which American policymakers have reacted
and the sheer volume of the (monetary and
fiscal) stimulus already provided or planned
is a stark reminder that European economic
governance institutions remain sorely inade-
quate. 
The design of a European economic
recovery programme 
Are there constraints on expansionary
policies?
A number of key elements of the analysis so
far need to be borne in mind when designing
a European programme to ensure that the
continent emerges as quickly and painlessly
as possible from the crisis. While a severe
downturn lasting several quarters is a cer-
tainty, and some countries with serious
imbalances to correct (UK, Ireland, Spain,
some new Member States such as Hungary
and the Baltic countries) will take some time
to redress them, the decisive question  is how
deep and, in particular, how protracted the
recession will be. There are some grounds
for cautious optimism. The first is that unlike
in 1929ff. (most) policymakers know what
has to be done: stimulate aggregate demand
to prevent cumulative recessionary/defla-
tionary processes, prevent a downward
wage/price spiral (and, internationally, a beg-
gar-thy-neighbour trade and exchange rate
policies) and underpin the banking system
with public money. We now know how to do
these things, and, secondly, Europe is, as a
whole, relatively unconstrained in imple-
menting the required measures:
• With central bank interest rates at 2.5%
(ECB) and 2% (Bank of England and
Swedish Rijksbank) there is still substan-
tial scope for conventional expansionary
monetary policy, in contrast to the US,
where the Fed has already cut to 1%.
• Similarly, at the level of the euro area and
the EU27, there is considerable room for
manoeuvre for fiscal policy. The budget
deficit in the current year is around -1.0%
(EU27 1.2%)16. Within the euro area only
France is close to the Maastricht ceiling
of 3%; outside it Hungary and the UK
have higher deficits. Moreover the struc-
tural primary balance (important for
longer-term consolidation and proxy for
the discretionary stance of budget policy)
was calculated as being comfortably in
surplus in the current year (1.9% and
1.4%), as it was also in both the previous
years.
• The EU and euro area are large integrated
economic areas with solid current account
positions and, with some exceptions out-
side the euro area, a strong, international
reserve currency. Thus there will be rela-
tively few demand leakages from expan-
sionary fiscal policies and there are no
significant constraints on the external
side; Europe does not have to worry about
capital flight or foreign creditors demand-
ing higher interest rates. 
The situation – in the short-term – is a text-
book case. We already have and we can
expect a massive fall-off in consumption and
investment demand. The level of demand
must be sustained if there are not to be major
job and output losses in the short term, with
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16 As assessed by the European Commission in July
of this year (European Commission 2008c).
Because of the crisis a slightly higher figure is now
likely.
the severe risk of a negative feedback loop
between the ‘financial’ and ‘real’ sectors –
for example rising unemployment leading to
increased defaults, worsening banks’ balance
sheets causing further lending cutbacks,
leading to more job losses. This would mean
a protracted depression with longer-term
effects (lower ‘potential’ growth). The pri-
vate sector faces constraints and is delever-
aging. The public authorities face few con-
straints in borrowing in their own currencies.
(This is the key fault in the ‘analysis’ of the
corner-shop economic commentators who
say that if borrowing got us into the mess it
cannot get us out of it.) And indeed, the pub-
lic authorities will have no choice but to
accept higher deficits:  if the private sector
decides to reduce its borrowing, public sec-
tor borrowing will have to increase, because
in the current climate it will be very hard to
expand net exports. 17 If fiscal loosening is
done ‘voluntarily’, i.e. by way of expansion-
ary fiscal policies, aggregate demand will
stabilise at a level not too far below the cur-
rent one. If the authorities resist this – as
happened in the Great Depression – demand
and output will contract sharply, ultimately
bringing about the same government
deficits, but at a much lower level of out-
put.18
A proposal for a European econom-
ic recovery programme
Against this background the following
recovery plan would be appropriate to the
economic situation in which the EU econo-
my finds itself and to its specific institution-
al set-up. The package consists of five ele-
ments: expansionary monetary policy; a
coordinated fiscal policy expansion; anti-
deflationary wage policies; continued efforts
to stabilise the financial sector; and ad hoc
national measures to break negative feed-
back loops.
First, the ECB and other central banks
should immediately announce their intention
to bring about zero or negative real interest
rates until it is clear that economic activity is
picking up again. With inflation falling rap-
idly (the current figure being 2.1%), this
implies an immediate further rate cut by the
ECB of at least 0.5%; even better would be a
full 1p.p. cut, bringing rates down to 1% (as
in the US). At the same time, the Bank
should announce that it is prepared to cut
further, down to zero if necessary, and that if
inflation dips below 0.5% it will immediate-
ly start quantitative easing operations (pur-
chasing tradable securities with central bank
money) in volumes sufficient to avert the
risk of deflation. In the very short run this
will stabilise economic actors’ expectations,
reduce risks of deflation, ease pressures on
the financial system, and reduce the risk of
further currency appreciation; gradually it
will stimulate aggregate demand.
Secondly, bearing in mind the lags that
always attend monetary policy operations,
and, in particular, the likelihood of the trans-
mission channel through the banks being
unusually sluggish at present, it is vital that
fiscal policy acts swiftly and in coordinated
fashion to inject spending directly into the
economy. There are three main issues: the
volume of the impulse; how to ensure that all
Member States contribute in a balanced and
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17 This is because of the mathematical identity that
net private sector saving plus net public sector sav-
ing (the opposite of the budget deficit) have to be
equal to the current account.
18 It may be useful in this context to recall the experi-
ences of Sweden and the UK in the early 1990s,
both of which were hit by severe shocks (in the case
of Sweden also involving a banking crisis). In both
cases the fiscal balance hit deficits of around 8% of
GDP, only to recover strongly as the economy
picked up and fiscal stimulus could be removed.
economically sensible way; and the appro-
priate mix of specific measures on the
expenditure and revenue sides. Given the
nature of EU policymaking, the latter point
should be largely left to the Member States
(see box). I put the need for discretionary fis-
cal stimulus in 2009 at 2% of GDP.19 The
really thorny issue is how this can best be
brought about in the context of EU policy-
making architecture. I propose the following
steps:
1. The European Commission announces
that it is suspending the excessive deficit
procedure (EDP) under the Stability and
Growth Pact for the duration of 2009, cit-
ing the ‘exceptional circumstances’
clause in the regulations. EDP monitor-
ing will resume in 2010 provided eco-
nomic growth is running at rates above
1%. Instead the Commission will moni-
tor the implementation of Member
States’ fiscal recovery plans. This step is
vital if fiscal action is to create positive
rather than negative expectations con-
cerning the medium-term.
2. Following a commitment by the
European Council, each Member State
must announce by the end of the year a
package of fiscal measures that will
inject or release spending of at least 1.5%
of national GDP during the course of
2009. Attempts, monitored by the
Commission, should be made to assess
plausible effective impacts – rather than
merely mechanical ones – of policy
measures on spending.20 This will tend to
favour direct spending by government.
3. Countries with strong budgetary posi-
tions, facing relatively large negative
shocks and/or with relatively small auto-
matic stabilisers – Spain is an obvious
example, but also Germany – should be
encouraged to do more.
4. Member States should also be required to
announce additional longer-term spend-
ing commitments in areas such as energy
efficiency, research and development.
Such measures will not have an immedi-
ate impact but will sustain demand into
2010 and beyond, contribute to medium-
term expectations of recovery and are
anyway desirable in terms of potential
output, sustainability goals, etc.
5. At the European level the measures
announced by the Commission in its
Communication from end November (see
above) should be implemented. A case in
point is the European Globalisation
Adjustment Fund which, in its first year,
has completely failed to achieve its stated
aim of assisting member states in cush-
ioning workers from negative impacts of
globalisation.21 Unspent monies from
this fund should be reallocated as quick-
ly as possible to productive uses, for
example boosting training programmes
for workers in crisis-hit regions.
6. The Commission should report to the
Council in June and at the end of the year
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19 The Commission called for 1.5%. The European
Council has agreed on a package closer to 1%. My
assessment is based on growth being around 3 p.p.
below trend in 2009. Allowing an average 1%
response by the automatic stabilisers in the short
run leaves a stabilisation gap of 2% of GDP. The
current proposal for 1% is not adequate given the
current state of the economy, although it will cer-
tainly help – provided it is actually implemented.
20 For instance cuts in VAT rates should make plausi-
ble estimates of the extent to which these will be
passed on in prices; income tax cuts should take
account of the different propensities to save of
those affected (privileging tax cuts for less affluent
households).
21 This was a failure foretold; see Watt/Kemekliene
2006.
on the progress made in implementing
the fiscal packages. Recalcitrant coun-
tries should face a procedure modelled
on the excessive deficit procedure.
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22 This is all the more important politically given the perception that
massive public support for the financial sector has, in the first
instance, benefited those on high incomes and capital owners.
The design of national fiscal measures
What sort of fiscal policy measures should Member States implement ? For pragmatic
political reasons the European authorities are right to remain agnostic about this. Proposals
for common EU-wide policy steps (such as a cut in VAT rates, as recently proposed by the
BRUEGEL institute (Pisani-Ferry et al. 2008) risk, in my view, generating opposition from
single countries, which might scupper the whole idea of a coordinated stimulus. There is
no intrinsic economic benefit in all countries injecting additional spending in the same
way. If it were possible to reach agreement on a common approach, however, there may be
some political (and indirectly possibly an economic benefit) in making visible a
‘European’ approach to resolving the crisis. The risks of such an approach appear much
greater than the limited potential benefits, however.
Member States should tailor their packages to their specific economic and institutional
conditions. The following general principles should be borne in mind.
• Increases in government spending will have a more immediate effect on demand than
tax cuts.
• Measures targeted at those on average incomes and below are less likely to lead to high-
er savings and will thus have greater impact.22
• Demand-management measures should be such that they can be reversed once the econ-
omy recovers, although ‘structural’ measures, such as those that promote a low-carbon
economy, should not.
• Wherever possible measures should be selected that also serve longer-term goals such
as productivity and sustainability.
• Both equity and efficiency consideration argue in favour of targeting measures on those
hardest hit by the crisis (implying, for example, a focus on labour market policy).
• While painful adjustment processes can and should be managed also using public funds,
unsustainable structures (industries, asset prices) should not be artificially propped up.
• Public investment has shrunk as a share of GDP in most European countries and should
be boosted (although this cannot be done overnight).
• Countries should adopt a mix of measures that combines desirable criteria (speed, effec-
tiveness, equity, long-run benefit, etc.) and reflecting national priorities and any rele-
vant institutional constraints.
Thirdly, Europe needs to erect a barrier
against the possibility of deflation. It must
avoid the mistakes made in the Great
Depression, and also by Japan in the 1990s,
of wages and prices chasing each other
down. This can be done by putting a floor
under nominal wages. In such a crisis down-
ward nominal wage rigidity is a key anchor
for the economy. Consistent ‘declaratory
politics’ will be needed as a starting point:
national governments, social partners and
the European authorities must publicly
emphasise the need for stable nominal wage
growth and their rejection of beggar-thy-
neighbour wage policies (cf. European Trade
Union Confederation 2008).23 In principle,
wage growth should always hold to a medi-
um-term orientation of the rate of productiv-
ity growth plus a price component (ideally
the target inflation rate of the central bank).
This implies normal wage growth (in the
euro area) of around 3-3.5%. In the current
context governments should announce that
they are seeking that all wage agreements
respect a minimum floor of 2%. Countries
with a tradition of social pacts could incor-
porate provisions specifying such a mini-
mum rate of nominal wage growth, while
recommending a continued orientation
towards medium-term productivity growth.24
Governments must ensure that statutory min-
imum and public sector wages are kept on a
stable growth path and should consider mak-
ing appropriate private-sector collective
agreements binding. At the European level
the ETUC and sectoral trade union federa-
tions should step up their monitoring of
wage bargaining and exert pressure on mem-
ber unions undermining the nominal wage
floor.  
After some 18 months of ‘bad news’ from
financial institutions, there is reason to hope
that the worst news from the financial sector
is already out. This may not be the case, how-
ever. So, fourthly, national governments
should continue to monitor the situation
extremely carefully and take appropriate
action to prevent systemically important
financial institutions from going under (see
also next section). As has more recently been
the case with rescue packages, this should be
done in such a way that costs to the taxpayer
are minimised and the authorities take a
share in any subsequent increase in the value
of equity. In most cases this requires the par-
tial or complete nationalisation of the entity
and the imposition of losses on shareholders,
and possibly also bondholders, and restric-
tions on certain operating practices.
Finally, fifthly, governments and, where
appropriate, social partners should take ad
hoc steps, depending on national circum-
stances, to break or mitigate negative cumu-
lative causation chains and alleviate the
social repercussions of the crisis. (To some
extent, these measures can be financed and
considered part of the fiscal policy package
described above.) Examples of such meas-
ures include programmes that prevent house
repossessions by encouraging mortgage
holders and homeowners to find repayment
solutions that enable people to retain their
homes25; similarly, banks, especially those in
receipt of public support, must be induced or
forced to continue lending to credit-worthy
businesses and households; measures (at
plant or sectoral level) that avoid redundan-
cies through variations in working time,
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23 The Commission should urgently and publicly alter
its wage policy recommendation in its recent com-
munication. 
24 Social pacts should not, however, be used as beg-
gar-thy-neighbour strategies. A coordination of
such pacts at European level, for example under the
auspices of the Macroeconomic Dialogue would be
advantageous.
25 If housing markets risk overshooting on the down-
side, more radical interventions to support prices
may be necessary. However, this should not involve
supporting bubble-inflated prices.
training programmes and other innovative
measures; an expansion of active labour mar-
ket policies; selective (and possibly tempo-
rary) improvements in the coverage of unem-
ployment benefit and other welfare systems.
Policy response in the medium
term: improving economic gover-
nance
The focus of this paper has been on steps to
ensure that the European economy avoids a
prolonged recession. Yet both the onset of the
crisis itself, and the inadequate reaction to it
so far, point to the need for far-reaching
reform of economic governance institutions
within the European Union and the euro
area; in some areas the crisis has exacerbat-
ed long-standing concerns, in others it has
raised new issues of economic management
and supervision. It is here that Europe should
concentrate its ‘structural reform’ efforts in
the coming months and years, to avoid future
crises and improve the collective scope for
addressing them. The most important areas
for reform, along with some proposals, are
briefly set out below. 26
Clearly root-and-branch re-regulation of
the financial sector is required. A large
number of proposals have been made in this
regard (e.g. Crotty/Epstein 2008; Stiglitz
2008). The key principle is that entities that
(rightly) expect the authorities to provide
support from public money in the event of
failure must be clearly defined and must, in
return, adhere to a set of rules that limits
risk-taking, not least regarding the sorts of
financial instruments they can issue and pur-
chase. Most consumers and pension/ insur-
ance funds, etc. should be restricted to
investing in the highly regulated sector. This
is the most effective way to rein in the
excesses of securitisation, leverage and
short-term executive incentives that we have
seen. High net worth individuals can be then
left free to risk their own money in a more
lightly (but not unregulated) ‘casino’ sector.
Such re-regulation is vitally necessary in
order to permit low real interest rates, which
are key to stimulating investment and
growth, without inducing private actors to
take excessive risks and ramp up leverage to
systemically dangerous levels.
What is essential from a European perspec-
tive is to avoid regulatory competition
between jurisdictions and ensure that
European-wide issues can be addressed at
the appropriate level. This means either the
establishment of a European public authority
in charge of regulating financial services
(European Financial Services Authority),
or, second-best, strong coordination mecha-
nisms between national regulators.
Linked to this, steps are required to limit the
procyclicality of the financial sector. In
this context some commentators have called
for an end of mark-to-market methods of
valuing book assets. Others have suggested
that central banks should target, alongside
consumer prices, also asset prices. This is a
case where the cure may well be worse than
the disease, however. The former recommen-
dation risks permitting firms to mark-to-
model, which can lead to cover up losses on
their books, while the latter, had it been prac-
tised in Europe in recent years, would have
meant substantially higher ECB rates: given
the already long time Europe took to recover
in the early years of this decade, one shud-
ders to think how the European economy
would have developed if rates had been, say
one percentage point higher. What is vital is
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26 Clearly addressing the global imbalances described
above also implies an agenda of reform of global
institutions to address current account imbalances,
exchange rate disequilibria, etc. For reasons of
space this is not addressed here. See for example
ITUC/TUAC/Global Unions (2008), and the contri-
butions in Eichengreen and Baldwin (2008).
to break the link between the current value of
book assets and financial institutions’ mini-
mum reserve/capital adequacy requirements.
Instead these should vary contra-cyclically.
The ECB itself has recognised this need 27
and various concrete proposals have been
made (e.g. Palley 2008b). Monetary policy
requires multiple instruments if it is to
pursue multiple goals. Active use of mini-
mum reserve requirements would enable
central banks to lean against the wind of
asset price developments, without at the
same time leading to excessively high (or
occasionally low) interest rates with respect
to the state of the real economy and con-
sumer inflation.
At the same time, ways need to be found to
increase the degree to which the central
bank takes into account the real economy
in setting interest rates, in order to avoid
major errors such as that by the ECB in the
summer. In fact, the ECB does have a sub-
sidiary mandate to support growth and jobs,
but European policymakers remain silent
when the ECB publicly repudiates this, say-
ing it has ‘only one needle in its compass’.
This is an old debate (see contributions in
Watt and Janssen 2006). Yet central bank
independence, in the sense of freedom from
day-to-day political interference, is compati-
ble with the strengthening of the ties between
the central bank and other actors (the euro
group, but also the social partners in the
Macroeconomic Dialogue). An advisory
council to the ECB with representatives of
social partners could be considered. I have
previously argued (Watt 2005a) that it is a
waste of political energy to call for a change
in the ECB’s mandate, requiring as this
would a Treaty change. If the crisis worsens,
however, this may come back on to the agen-
da. In any case, the ECB has considerable
leeway in interpreting its mandate, and could
make more explicit a commitment to stabil-
ising the real economy (e.g. by referring pub-
licly to Taylor-type rules or to a target path
for nominal GDP growth).
The Stability and Growth Pact has been
substantially reformed since its Mark I ver-
sion (Watt 2005b). Yet still it risks constrain-
ing necessary government activities. Public
investment should not be subject to annual
budgetary surveillance. More importantly,
the Pact remains focussed on negative policy
spillovers, and is thus inadequate to promote
the positive fiscal policy spillovers that must
be mobilised in times of crisis. In times such
as these, it is important that countries are not
able to free-ride on other countries’ expan-
sionary measures, and corresponding proce-
dures should be introduced. Even after
improvements, there is still too much focus
on the extent of deficits and too little on the
degree of counter-cyclicality. More general-
ly, within the euro area the interaction
between national fiscal policy and real
exchange rates, (and thus relative competi-
tiveness and current account imbalances
within the EMU) is complex, and inade-
quately taken into account by the SGP
(Allsopp and Watt 2003; Allsopp and Vines
2008)
More generally, our economies would be less
subject to the vagaries of investor sentiment
if a somewhat larger proportion of total
spending on goods and services in the econ-
omy – this is not an issue about redistributive
transfers – was in the public sphere. In con-
crete terms, this implies an increase in pub-
lic investment to levels typical of advanced
capitalist economies not so long ago (around
3% of GDP). This should be coupled with a
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27 See for example the recent speech by ECB
President Trichet to the 18th Frankfurt  European
Banking Congress, http://74.125.77.132/search?q=
cache:uQR7uAH1k38J:www.ecb.int/press/key/
date/2008/html/sp081121.en.html+trichet+ecb+spe
e c h + c r i s i s + p r o - c y c l i c a l & h l = e n & c t =
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more strategic approach to industrial policy,
in particular with a view to the required tran-
sition to a low-carbon economy, which will
not come about through market signals alone
(Larsson and Begg 2007, Degryse and
Pochet 2009).
Conclusion and outlook
In the teeth of a serious economic downturn,
this analysis has been ‘conditionally opti-
mistic’ about the medium-term prospects for
the European economy. In the short term,
there will be a significant contraction of
activity. Some countries with imbalances to
work off will remain with below-trend
growth for an extended period. Substantial
known unknowns (in particular risks in the
massive credit default swap market, which is
poorly understood) remain, along with, sure-
ly, some unknown unknowns. Financial cri-
sis are unpredictable as their course is sus-
ceptible to herd behaviour and panics.
However, indeed precisely because of this,
there is no cause for fatalism. Some of the
restrictive forces have already been lifted to
varying extents (commodity prices,
exchange rates, interest rates). Lower asset
prices will create new opportunities, once
sentiment can be turned around. More
importantly, European and national policy-
makers have the knowledge, the tools and the
policymaking ‘room for manoeuvre’ to turn
the European economy around. The question
is: will they use those tools?
The signs are mixed. Policymakers who have
recently been happily singing from the
hymn-sheet of liberal financial capitalism
have in many cases been quick to adopt prag-
matic non-market solutions. The
Commission has also, if belatedly, dropped
some of its old thinking and has set forward
a broadly sensible recovery package. Most
recently the European Council has offered its
– lukewarm – support. Similarly, the ECB
has cut rates, although not far or fast enough.
However, the concerns about fiscal free-rid-
ing are intractable. The current debate on
expansionary fiscal policy in Germany, the
largest single economy, can only be
described as bizarre. A large country, badly
hit by cutbacks in domestic and foreign
spending on investment goods, with a virtu-
ally balanced budget, a massive current
account surplus, and a particularly serious
negative (regressive) shift in income distri-
bution (OECD 2008) and years of depressed
domestic demand and under-investment in
public infrastructure has been discussing
stimulus packages that are absolutely deriso-
ry (and also badly targeted). German media
is dominated by so-called experts who queue
up to denounce higher spending as being
merely a ‘straw fire’ and worry about the
debt burden on future generations.28 The
German finance minister has lectured the
UK on its supposedly irresponsible bailout
and stimulation policies – and in return been
castigated by the current Nobel laureate,
Paul Krugman. A disaster for Germany, such
policy advice is a serious blow for Europe,
both because of the weight of Germany in
the European economy, and the disincentive
effects that such a stance, if maintained, will
have. It is vital that Germany substantially
loosens its belt in the current crisis. The gov-
ernment’s current reluctance to countenance
this is one of the key reasons for remaining
pessimistic about the short-term future of the
European economy.
A second main risk is that the ECB will con-
tinue to remain behind the curve. If it waits
too long and prices start to fall, then (con-
ventional) monetary policy will have lost its
effectiveness and the situation could become
very serious indeed.
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Makroökonomie und Konjunkturforschung, see
various articles and statements under
http://www.boeckler.de/31923.html.
There are some unknowns in the equation,
notably the possibility that nasty surprises,
hidden to date, remain in some area of the
financial system. However, even these could
probably be coped with using the sort of
measures recommended here, although the
dosage would have to be increased in such a
case. This emphasises the need to move
quickly. The credit default market is clearly
sensitive to the number of bankruptcies.
Policymakers must on no account use the
threat of such markets imploding as an argu-
ment to ‘save their ammunition’. On the con-
trary, the contractions in the ‘real’ and
‘financial’ sectors are inextricably linked.
Aggregate demand and real output must be
stabilised now.
The central finding of this analysis can be
stated starkly. Europe need not experience a
repeat of 1929 (or even the early 1990s).
Given its fundamentals and the policy tools
at its disposal, the downturn, although
painful and costly, need only be relatively
short and not too deep. We are not con-
demned to repeat every historical tragedy.
The risks of inaction are great, however. The
crisis will not resolve itself. A number of
financial-market time-bombs are in all prob-
ability ticking. It is only swift and resolute –
but not particularly complex or institutional-
ly demanding – policy action that will pre-
vent the situation deteriorating into a lost
decade, as in Japan, or in the worst case, a
major meltdown on the lines of the Great
Depression.
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